entry on Arnold. 5 That Collini would repeat the quotation is not especially remarkable. Lionel Trilling uses the same line at least three times: in his masterly 1939 study of Arnold, his 1949 introduction to the Viking "portable" edition, and his 1954 essay in Major British Writers. 6 The line quoted from Jowett is actually a fragment: Collini docks the tail of Jowett's second sentence, the whole running: 'He was the most sensible man of genius whom I have ever known and the most free from personality.'
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It is easy to see why Collini omits this equivocal phrase, since it seems to cast a slight shadow across the otherwise perfectly clear horizon of Jowett's eulogism. What does Jowett mean -'the most free from personality'? Trilling finds a chilliness in that final phrase and supposes that Jowett is hinting at Arnold's remoteness and grand-style austerity. Arnold's reputation for Olympian aloofness might have its roots here and in the similar insinuations of W. H. Auden and J. Hillis Miller. Does Arnold not claim at 30, for instance, that he is already 'three-parts iced over', as he says in a letter and as his poetry might seem to confirm? 8 Jowett's ambiguity could similarly imply that Arnold, as Trilling says, is 'frozen over' but 'fearfully conscious of what lies beneath the ice'. 9 Trilling somewhat revises this quasi-Freudian interpretation in 1949, noting that 'it was not our present sense of the word "personality" that Jowett intended -he meant that there was no impulse in Arnold to make any special claim for himself, or to ask for any indulgence '. 10 While this revision makes for a clearer conception of Arnold's character, it seems rather a net loss in proximity to Jowett's meaning.
Trilling's reading of this Victorian usage can bear further refining. The term receives some light from a comment that Samuel Taylor Coleridge makes in an 1809 number of The Friend, in which he lambasts 5 Stefan Collini, Arnold (Oxford and New York 1988) p. 24; 'Arnold, Matthew (1822 -1888 this AGE OF PERSONALITY, this age of literary and political GOSSIPING, when the meanest insects are worshipped with a sort of Egyptian superstition, if only the brainless head be atoned for by the sting of personal malignity in the tail! When the most vapid satires have become the objects of a keen public interest, purely from the number of contemporary characters named in the patchwork notes . . .
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Trilling is correct in noting that Jowett does not use personality in 'our present sense of the word', since the word, in Arnold's day as in Coleridge's, still comprehends a large part of what we now mean when we speak of making personal remarks about someone, that descent from the critical high road to the level of mere ad hominem commentary, a move that criticism is conventionally advised to eschew. For Jowett, Arnold is 'free from personality' in the sense that he does not stoop to personal invective and private insult of this kind. He does not indulge in personality. The veracity of Jowett's claim is disputable. The Victorian clergyman John Tulloch, for instance, feels that the 'irrepressible scorn with which [Arnold's] style is constantly mantling' signals a defect and that his arguments are 'impaired by such headlong personalities', while the Oxford don Walter Raleigh thinks Arnold not quite free enough from personality: 'Nothing can exceed the quiet impertinence of his use of proper names.' 12 In any case, Jowett obviously does not mean that Arnold is himself without a personality in 'our present sense' of the word. Arnold himself demonstrates the usual Victorian usage in a late essay, 'Civilization in the United States' (1888), in his description of the general quality of American newspapers: 'The absence of truth and soberness in them, the poverty in serious interest, the personality and sensationmongering, are beyond belief ' (CPW xi. 361).
On the other hand, an 1867 letter from Arnold to his mother points up the Victorian usage of the word personal in a form more congenial to Trilling's sense: 'I more and more become conscious of having something to do', Arnold writes, 'and of a resolution to do it . . . I shall, I hope, do something of it, but whether one lives long or not, to be less and less personal in one's desires and workings is the great matter' (Letters iii. original emphasis). As this letter implies, Arnold aims not to cease desiring tout court but to desire impersonally, although this might sound rather like a distinction without a difference. The ideal of impersonal desire recalls Arnold's 'disinterested endeavor to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world' (CPW iii. 283), and it also harmonises with his encomium on Arthur Hugh Clough, who 'had the most undivided and disinterested love for his object in itself, the greatest aversion to mixing up with it anything accidental or personal', and whose 'interest was in literature itself; and it was this that gave so rare a stamp to his character, which kept him so free from all taint of littleness' and from the 'saturnalia of personal passions' (CPW i. 215). Nevertheless, notions like disinterested love and impersonal desire are apt to strike modern readers as paradoxical. Like most of the other mid-century moralists, Arnold tries to split the difference between two extremes: the public altruists deplore the purely hedonic calculus of ethical egoism, and they dearly wish to arouse altruistic feelings, so the cultivation of the emotions is encouraged because the deepest feelings are assumed to be innately good and productive of socially desirable actions.
At the same time, Victorian moralists betray a constant anxiety about the dangers of excessive emotionality, which could not only lead a man to effeminacy -an affront to all manly and muscular Christians -but such sentimentality could also cause, as Kirstie Blair's recent study shows, heart disease and other more 'peculiarly feminine complaints'. 13 Arnold's reconciliation of these contrary claims is distinctly different from that of his fellow public moralists. He was strongly influenced by Ralph Waldo Emerson's transcendentalism in the 1840s, as his notebooks and letters to Clough make clear, and his notion of impersonality is arguably drawn at least in part from such Emerson essays as 'The Over-Soul' (1841) and 'Circles' (1841) . But the problem with Emersonian impersonality lies in its faulty relation between impersonality and personality, as Emerson scholar Sharon Cameron notes: 'The deficiency in Emerson's representation of the impersonal lies peculiarly in the missing sense of a person.'
14 Playfully paradoxical as the formulation sounds, it is just here that Arnold corrects his New England teacher. Unlike Emerson, Arnold proves his case for critical and ethical disinterestedness by means of an even greater emotional investment in the other, an investment so forgetful of self that it approaches the kind of ethical absolutism that one finds today, for 13 Kirstie Blair, Victorian Poetry and the Culture of the Heart (Oxford and New York 2006) p. 11.
14 Sharon Cameron, Impersonality: Seven Essays (Chicago and London 2007) p. 81. example, in the thought of Emmanuel Lévinas and Jacques Derrida, with their devotion to a selflessness that wholly subtends ontology and subordinates itself utterly to the other, even as the very source and font of subjectivation.
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From Wraggs to Wretches Arnold personalises impersonality by dramatising and embodying it, by performing it, and this movement appears plainly in 'The Function of Criticism at the Present Time' (1865) when he famously riffs on the line, 'Wragg is in custody'. In the paragraphs preceding his introduction of Wragg, Arnold quotes the triumphalist bragging of several Victorian milites gloriosos who expatiate thus: 'Such a race of people as we stand, so superior to all the world! The old Anglo-Saxon race, the best breed in the whole world! I pray that our unrivalled happiness may last! I ask you whether, the world over or in past history, there is anything like it?' (CPW iii. 273). Now rhetoric in such a register threatens, Arnold claims, to trap the mind 'in a sphere, to say the truth, perfectly unvital, a sphere in which spiritual progression is impossible'. To short-circuit this saturnalia of racial and national passions, Arnold first quotes the following brief (and previously unidentified) And the final touch, -short, bleak, and inhuman: Wragg is in custody. The sex lost in the confusion of our unrivalled happiness; or (shall I say) the superfluous Christian name lopped off by the straightforward vigour of our Anglo-Saxon breed! There is profit for the spirit in such contrasts as this; criticism serves the cause of perfection by establishing them. By eluding sterile conflict, by refusing to remain in the sphere where alone narrow and relative conceptions have any worth and validity, criticism may diminish its momentary importance, but only in this way has it a chance of gaining admittance for those wider and more perfect conceptions to which all its duty is really owed. Mr. Roebuck will have a poor opinion of an adversary who replies to his defiant songs of triumph only by murmuring under his breath, Wragg is in custody; but in no other way will these songs of triumph be induced gradually to moderate themselves, to get rid of what in them is excessive or offensive, and to fall into a softer and truer key. Reactions to this specimen of Arnold's signature vivacity come thick and fast. His contemporary critics judge Arnold to be 'affected', 'whimsical, and petulant' in sporting with the name of Wragg. contemporary reviewer, thinks he detects 'just a grain of fatuity' in Arnold's essay, the sort that comes 'from too warm a self-satisfaction' -a coded phrase for egoism, chiefest of sins.
19 But the most interesting specimen is James Fitzjames Stephen's in the Saturday Review. Stephen had long been among Arnold's most caustic and hard-hitting critics. In the case of Wragg, Stephen's mincing imitation of the 'higher criticism' parodies Arnold's apparently super-fine scrupulosity:
Criticism ought to show that Wragg should have been called (say) Fairfax; and that, instead of saying 'Wragg is in custody', the brutal journalist should have said, 'And so, on that cold November night, the door of Nottingham gaol was shut behind our sinful sister'. To the general public this way of putting it may not seem to make much difference, but Mr. Arnold thinks otherwise. . . . We do not envy the higher criticism if it has to go about 'murmuring Wragg is in custody', till all afterdinner speeches rise to the level of ideal beauty.
20
Stephen's wit cannot obscure the serious point of difference between his position, which one might describe as compassionate conservatism avant la lettre, and Arnold's personal impersonality. Stephen's fellow-feeling is akin to Emerson's, and 'The great shame of Emerson', as Cameron says, 'is his callous indifference to the social distinctions he occasionally recognizes '. 21 This attitude -in Stephen as well as Emerson -is apt to express itself practically in indifference towards the pain of others and in an authoritarian tendency to undercut the personal autonomy of others. Stephen was notorious for his unstinting adherence to Benthamism's 'proper principles of rigidity and ferocity', and Emerson's impersonality might even be better termed depersonality, if only to chime with T. S. Eliot's claim that the 'progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality. . . . It is in this depersonalization that art may be said to approach the condition of science.' 22 For Arnold, by contrast, 'the condition of science' is the least desirable state to which to bring art. He would sooner see art -in his terms, 'letters' -comprehend both science 19 and religion, and he deliberately privileges the aesthetic realm in conscious opposition to the positivist and objectivist pretensions of physics and metaphysics (CPW x. 55).
The ground of Arnold's rhetorical strategy lies in the elements of philosophical pessimism that lurk in his Liberal 'renouncement'. The post-Kantian German idealist Arthur Schopenhauer, often called the father of philosophical pessimism, claimed that his moral philosophy agrees with the innermost truths of Christianity: that suffering is the law of life, compassion the ethical imperative, and transcendence of the will the only path to liberation. Schopenhauer's assessment of life's misery is echoed, surprisingly, by the 1914 Catholic Encyclopedia, still the online standard: 'It can hardly be disputed that the Christian view of life in itself is scarcely less pessimistic than that of Schopenhauer . . . and its pains are regarded as essentially characteristic of its present condition.'
23 In comparing his pessimistic ethics to other ethical systems, Schopenhauer senses his close affinity to Buddhism, but he finally concludes that 'Christianity is nearest at hand', for it 'leads not only to the highest degrees of charity and human kindness, but also to renunciation'. 24 In his view, 'the greatest, the most important, and the most significant phenomenon that the world can show is not the conqueror of the world, but the overcomer of the world', for on him 'has dawned the knowledge in consequence of which he gives up and denies that will-to-live that fills everything, and strives and strains in all', and his actions 'now become the very opposite of the ordinary'. 25 The truth of self-renunciation, however, is not one that the world of ordinary selves cares to acknowledge: 'The history of the world will, and indeed must, always keep silence about the persons whose conduct is the best and only adequate illustration' of renunciation, because to the ordinary self 'it is not the denial and the giving up of the will-to-live' that defines the good, 'but its affirmation and manifestation in innumerable individuals in which its dissension with itself [is] at the highest point of its objectification'.
Arnold parallels Schopenhauer's line of ethical thought in St. Paul and Protestantism (1870) and Literature and Dogma (1873), all the while assiduously cloaking his ideas in traditional Christian diction. Even in Culture and Anarchy, in order to stop the many ordinary English selves incessantly doing as they like, Arnold speaks of 'the love of Christ constraining us to crucify, as he did, and with a like purpose of moral regeneration, the flesh with its affections and lusts, and thus establishing, as we have seen, the law' (CPW v. 167 ). This 'law of our mind' takes account of 'the universal moral order, the will of God, and is indeed the voice of that order expressing itself in us' and telling us, apparently, to crucify our ordinary selves and become the enlightened ones whose actions, as Schopenhauer says, are the very opposite of ordinary (CPW vi. 31). Arnold's 'everyday self ', wholly devoted as it is to 'doing as one likes', is 'separate, personal, at war' with all other ordinary selves, and will 'not carry us beyond the ideas and wishes of the class to which we happen to belong' (CPW v. 134). The only authority capable of curbing this anarchy of ordinary selves lies in the 'best self ', which 'inspires faith, and is capable of affording a serious principle of authority' (CPW v. 135). Our ordinary self must thus submit to our best self, for 'by our best self we are united, impersonal, at harmony' (CPW v. 134) . Since the conduct of the ordinary self is intractable and opposed to the 'recognition' of the 'best self, or right reason', Arnold suggests that we 'try to go a little deeper, and to find, beneath our actual habits and practice, the very ground and cause out of which they spring' (CPW v. 162). Predictably, this 'ground and cause' comprise a binary opposition, perhaps the most famous of all the dualities that structure Arnold's thought: Hellenism and Hebraism. The latter is the locus of moral order: 'Self-conquest, self-devotion, the following not of our individual will, but the will of God, obedience, is the fundamental idea', and to this we give 'the general name of Hebraism' (CPW v. 165-6). Arnold's 'will of God' and 'law of our mind', the voice of the universal moral order expressing itself in us, approximates to what Schopenhauer calls the intellect, which was originally a product of and in complete subservience to the will but which now and then, in saints and sages, wholly overcomes, silences, and ultimately renounces the will. Moments of aesthetic contemplation give a foretaste of this holy selflessness, according to Schopenhauer, because the aesthetic pleasure in the beautiful consists, to a large extent, in the fact that, when we enter the state of pure contemplation, we are raised for the moment above all willing, above all desires and cares; we are, so to speak, rid of ourselves. We are no longer the individual that knows in the interest of its constant willing . . . From this we can infer how blessed must be the life of a man whose will is silenced not for a few moments, as in the enjoyment of the beautiful, but for ever, indeed completely extinguished, except for the last glimmering spark that maintains the body and is extinguished with it.
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This ascetic ideal touches the zero degree of Schopenhauerian will-denial. Arnold never embraces the celibacy that philosophical pessimism logically entails, and in one of his few detailed references to Schopenhauer, Arnold claims in the preface to Last Essays on Church and Religion (1877) that the German philosopher's advocacy of 'abstinence from further sexual propagation' is 'plainly, somehow or other, a paradox, and that human thought (I say it with due deference to the many persons for whom Schopenhauer is just now in fashion) instinctively feels it to be absurd' (CPW viii. 160).
There is no evidence that Arnold read Schopenhauer, and he could have drawn his knowledge from any of numerous secondary sources available at this time, as his allusion to the 'fashion' for Schopenhauer suggests. In the twelve months prior to the publication of Last Essays, for example, more than a dozen notices and reviews of Schopenhauer's philosophy had been published in British and French journals, the common sources of Arnold's notions of the trends in contemporary thought. In addition, Helen Zimmern's highly successful biography of Schopenhauer appeared while Arnold was writing Last Essays, and James Sully's best-selling Pessimism: A History and a Criticism (1877) was published the same year, so the Schopenhauer fashion was clearly raging in the mid-1870s. 27 In characterising Schopenhauer's system of sexual self-denial, however, Arnold does not directly quote the philosopher's writings, nor does he cite any of the recent reviews (CPW viii. 159). Instead, he quotes from a six-year-old Revue des Deux Mondes essay on Schopenhauer by Paul-Armand Challemel-Lacour, ten passages from which he transcribes into his notebook in August, 1876.
28 Several of these notebook quotations he then uses in the preface to Last Essays, and a closer look at the Revue context from which these passages are drawn suggests that Arnold recognised his own uncanny kinship with the father of German pessimism. The absurdity that he says he 'instinctively feels' towards Schopenhauerian celibacy seems particularly focused on the Challemel-Lacour passage that he quotes in the preface -'In abstinence from further propagation of mankind is salvation. This would gradually bring about the extinction of our species, and, with our extinction, that of the universe, since the universe requires for its existence the co-operation of human thought.' The passage occurs in Challemel-Lacour's exposition of the Buddhistic aspects of Schopenhauer's ethics. la série des nidanas ou des causes, il arrive au bord du nirvana, de l'anéantissement volontaire, dans lequel on trouve le salut. Tel est aussi le résultat que notre philosophe [i.e. Schopenhauer] propose aux efforts de l'homme. Pour l'atteindre, il y a la voie de la spéculation, par laquelle on découvre le mystère de l'illusion infinie, et la voie de l'expérience pratique du malheur attaché à l'être et du néant de la vie. Ces deux voies sont celles que suivent naturellement les sages et qui les conduisent, quand ils ont secoué les rêves de la jeunesse et les ambitions de l'âge mûr, à la résignation parfaite; mais elles ne sont pas praticables à la foule des hommes. C'est pourquoi les religions leur en ont ouvert une autre, elles ont inventé des moyens artificiels, et cependant efficaces, d'engendrer les âmes au détachement. Par l'ascétisme et les mortifications méthodiquement pratiquées, elles triomphent de l'amour de la vie, elles conduisent leurs croyans [sic] au dédain du plaisir, puis de l'existence, et de privation en privation elles les mènent, en dépit des protestations de la chair, à la continence, qui est le salut, car en se généralisant elle entraînerait peu à peu l'extinction de l'espèce, et, avec l'extinction de l'espèce, celle de l'univers, puisqu'il requiert pour exister le concours de la pensée humaine.
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The kinship with Arnold's thought is readily seen here. Schopenhauer's 'perfect resignation', his 'detachment', and the ascetic rigours leading to 'annihilation of the will' -all are elements in Arnold's own ethic of 29 Paul-Armand Challemel-Lacour, 'Un Bouddhiste Contemporain en Allemagne', Revue des Deux Mondes, 86 (15 Mar. 1870) p. 329. I would translate the passage thus: 'the series of causes, arriving at the verge of nirvana, of annihilation of the will, in which one finds salvation. This is also the result that he [Schopenhauer] proposes for mankind's willing. Two ways lead to this result: the way of speculation, by which one uncovers the mystery of the infinite illusion, and the way of practical experience, by which one learns of the suffering that inheres in being and of the meaninglessness of life. These two ways, followed naturally by the wise once they have shaken off the dreams of youth and the ambitions of adulthood, lead to perfect resignation. Yet these paths are not practicable for the majority of human beings, and this is why religions have found another way. Religions invented artificial though no less efficacious means of leading souls to detachment. By asceticism and practical disciplines of mortification, they overcome the love of life, leading the mind to the disdain first of pleasure and then of existence itself. From privation to privation, and in spite of the flesh's protests, they guide the soul to sexual abstinence, which is salvation, for as abstinence becomes general it will gradually lead to the extinction of the species. And with the extinction of the species will follow that of the universe, which requires the cooperation of human thought for its existence.' 'renouncement', the features of which appear early in his poetry and form the bass tone of his prose as well, a compound of Stoic asceticism, Christian mysticism, and the Buddhist metaphysics that Clough once mocked as 'his rehabilitated Hindoo-Greek theosophy'. 30 The last step, however, continence, the 'abstinence from further propagation', is too 'absurd' a 'paradox' for Arnold to accept, not to mention that it savours rather strongly of Puseyism. Chastity was one thing -three-eighths of life, in Arnold's calculus -but celibacy quite another. Yet suffering and dying in the flesh in order to live in Christ was Arnold's ceaseless refrain: we must be 'baptized into the death of the great exemplar of self-devotion and self-annulment', he says, a truth that even history bears out: 'Through age after age and generation after generation, our race, or all that part of our race which was most living and progressive, was baptized into a death; and endeavored, by suffering in the flesh, to cease from sin' (CPW v. 183, 170) .
Between 1868 and 1872 Arnold and his wife Frances buried three of their sons, so even if he could not embrace Schopenhauer's paradoxical method of ego extirpation through species extinction, Arnold's familyplanning sympathies still appear plainly enough in Culture and Anarchy's discussion of the multitudes of pauper children in the East End of London, 'children eaten up with disease, half-sized, half-fed, half-clothed, neglected by their parents, without health, without home, without hope' (CPW v. 217) . In repeating his usual mantra -'Individual perfection is impossible so long as the rest of mankind are not perfected along with us' -Arnold also roundly criticises the contemporary truisms, from the 'Be fruitful and multiply' of Hebraism, to the Times -Liberal complacency of 'There is nobody to blame for this; it is the result of Nature's simplest laws', to the popular language 'which describes children as sent' (CPW v. 217, 215) . He gives a particularly sharp rebuke to the poet Robert Buchanan's lively vision of God's 'Divine philoprogenitiveness', which 'would swarm the earth with beings. There are never enough. Life, life, life, -faces gleaming, hearts beating, must fill every cranny. Not a corner is suffered to remain empty. The whole earth breeds, and God glories.'
31 To a longsuffering political economist at the Spectator, Arnold's reply to Buchanan seems to say 'that the thing to be taught is apparently Malthusianism', a teaching still tantamount to blasphemy in mid-Victorian England. the mid-1880s, however, the scientific meliorist Jane Hume Clapperton, in a much more sympathetic and vigorously feminist register, frankly claims that in Culture and Anarchy 'Mr. Arnold touches the tender spot of our diseased social state, and points to the very nucleus or centre, from which there radiates -poverty and pauperism -social pressure and fierce competitionand disease, with all the misery and wretchedness that follow in its train'.
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William E. Gladstone once praised John Stuart Mill's 'forgetfulness of self ' but later rejected a proposed memorial tribute for Mill in 1875 after the 'revelation' of Mill's Malthusianist leanings early in life, an 'act of cowardice' on Gladstone's part 'for which he has been condemned by even his most eulogistic biographers'. 34 The advocacy of rational family planning was thus no risk-free venture in 1869, and the deepest irony in Arnold's sporting with the vulgar name of Wragg might well lie here in Buchanan's 'Divine philoprogenitiveness' and in the line of poetry, which Mr. Robert Buchanan throws in presently after the poetical prose I have quoted, -''Tis the old story of the fig-leaf time' -this fine line, too, naturally connects itself, when one is in the East of London, with the idea of God's desire to swarm the earth with beings; because the swarming of the earth with beings does indeed, in the East of London, so seem to revive the old story of the fig-leaf time, such a number of the people one meets there having hardly a rag to cover them; and the more the swarming goes on, the more it promises to revive this old story. And when the story is perfectly revived, the swarming quite completed, and every cranny choke-full, then, too, no doubt, the faces in the East of London will be gleaming faces, which Mr. Robert Buchanan says it is God's desire they should be, and which everyone must perceive they are not at present, but, on the contrary, very miserable. (CPW v. 215) Passages such as these sometimes lead critics to accuse Arnold of viewing suffering humanity a little too much de haut en bas, insulting' addresses seem to be written with 'a smile of heart-broken forbearance, as of a teacher in an idiot school'.
36 Of more immediate relevance is Arnold's pessimistic point about 'renouncement' as the master trope of culture, as paradoxical and absurd as its logical extension to continence may be, as well as the programmatic role that self-control and selfgovernment play in Arnold's rhetorical style.
There Is Nothing Like Positive Instances When Arnold proclaims, in Culture and Anarchy, that 'Renouncement is the law of human life' (CPW v. 207), he is pushing Victorian altruism towards its most 'extreme tendency' in obliging us to devote all our actions to the benefit of others. 37 Arnold states the position in St. Paul and Protestantism in absolute terms: 'All impulses of selfishness conflict with Christ's feelings, he showed it by dying to them all; if you are one with him by faith and sympathy, you can die to them also' (CPW vi. 48). When Arnold then sets out, in Literature and Dogma, to demonstrate the truth of this rule of renunciation, he rolls out the big guns -Plato, Aristotle, Horace, saints Peter and Paul, Bishop Wilson, even Wordsworth -all are marshalled to support the demand that we 'go without, go without!' (CPW vi. 295). The schoolman-like tenor produced by this parade of authorities modulates to a modern key when Arnold describes Christ's teaching as 'a profound truth of what our scientific friends, who have a systematic philosophy and a nomenclature to match, and who talk of Egoism and Altruism, would perhaps call, psycho-physiology' (CPW vi. 294). As keen a genealogist of morals as any whom the century produced, Arnold eagerly looks to his 'scientific friends' for fresh knowledge and insights. But their 'systematic philosophy' becomes anathema to him when edification is his primary rhetorical goal, and this is just the point at which Arnold unveils his rhetoric of ethical exemplarity, his moral touchstones. The teaching of Jesus is beautiful, Arnold says, precisely because he 'does not appeal to a speculative theory of the system of things, and deduce conclusions from it', but stands instead on the 'far safer ground' of practical experience and speaks directly to the question of conduct (CPW vi. 296) . For 'the discipline of conduct', as Arnold never tires of repeating, 'is three-fourths of life', and of the remainder, 'art and science divide this one-fourth fairly between them' -in other words, an exiguous one-eighth of life comprises the domain of 'our scientific friends', the systematic philosophers -but it seems that Jesus 'exhibited nothing for [their] And [Jesus] shows his greatness in this, because the law of our being is not something which is already definitely known and can be exhibited as part of a speculative theory of the system of things; it is something which discovers itself and becomes, as we follow (among other things) the rule of renouncement. (CPW vi. 296) This passage reveals both the nub of Arnold's ethics and its remarkably modern tenor. His conception of human nature does not derive from a theory of 'psycho-physiology' or any system of transcendental metaphysics but instead is conceived in determinate historical contingency as a selfcreative process of becoming. Without denying the strongly Platonic bent to Arnold's thought, one could venture that this passage goes far to answer claims that his thinking depends on what Fitzjames Stephen called 'transcendental' ideals, the sort that Amanda Anderson now describes as 'falsely universal and ultimately dangerous'. 38 To Stephen, Arnold's thought 'assumes the truth of the transcendental theory of philosophy', although he 'surely cannot be ignorant of the fact that, from the days of Hobbes and Locke to those of Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain, the most influential of English thinkers have utterly denied the truth of transcendentalism, and have constantly affirmed that all knowledge is based upon experience and sensation'. In short, Stephen objects to Arnold's epistemology and, like the Cambridge philosopher Henry Sidgwick, he seems to detect in Arnold the influence of Hegel or Emerson (or merely of Oxford).
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Anderson, on the other hand, while equally attuned to ideological orthodoxy, addresses the more recently inherited caricature of Arnold as bourgeois hegemone and Eurocentric essentialist, a characteristic product of late twentieth-century intellectual fashions in neo-Marxist and postcolonial discourses. Representing the chronological extremes of Arnold commentary, Stephen and Anderson illustrate the persistence of the tropes of Arnold's supposed naive nominalism, socio-political quietism, and otherworldly idealism, all elements in the standard academic caricature of Arnold. This idée reçue has proved durable, although Arnold's epistemological critique can equally be taken as heralding the kind of postmetaphysical and antifoundational tendencies current in philosophy today. In his imitation of Christ's rhetoric, Arnold eschews theoretical abstractions in favour of the concrete facts of practical experience, an empirical, inductive method that he employs as early as his 1860 discussion of the 'grand style' in poetry. 'I may discuss what, in the abstract, constitutes the grand style', he says, 'but that sort of general discussion never much helps our judgment of particular instances', and so he prefers instead 'to take specimens of the grand style, and to put them side by side' with specimens of the author in question (CPW i. 136) . A similar avoidance of abstraction is advised in 'The Function of Criticism'. When Arnold considers the means by which criticism can best 'establish a current of fresh and true ideas' by means of a 'disinterested endeavor' after the best that has been known and thought in the world, he advises that 'the great safeguard is never to let oneself become abstract' and always to remember that the 'mere judgment and application of principles' is not the aim, for 'like mathematics, it is tautological, and cannot well give us, like fresh learning, the sense of creative activity' (CPW iii. 282-3). Arnold consistently treats mathematics and criticism virtually as mutually exclusive terms, with his inductive method of touchstone knowledge relying not on demonstration but on intuition or, as his more theoretically inclined critics claim, on purely arbitrary standards of personal taste.
The same rhetorical tactic that makes living 'specimens' and concrete examples the essence of the literary touchstone method also determines Arnold's discussion of conduct in Literature and Dogma: 'let us eschew all school-terms, like moral sense, and volitional, and altruistic, which philosophers employ, and let us help ourselves by the most palpable and plain examples', and if anyone should ask, 'But what is the application of emotion to morality, and by what marks may we know it? -we can quite easily satisfy him; not, indeed, by any disquisition of our own, but in a much better way, by examples' (CPW vi. 173, 177) . Arnold makes his most explicit and detailed criticism of the predominant philosophical and theological methodology in 'The God of Metaphysics', chapter 2 of God and the Bible (1875), and he does so in terms that today could justly be termed antifoundational. Arnold interrogates Descartes's famous dictum -along with such other metaphysical lumber as 'essence, existence, substance, finite, infinite, cause and succession' -and he declares himself unashamed at 'entertaining such a tyro's question', even expressing a readiness to 'confess without shame, -for to the prick of shame in these matters, after all the tauntings and mockings we have had to undergo, we are by this time quite dead, -we shall confess that from this fundamental axiom of Descartes we were never able to derive the light and satisfaction which others derived from it' (CPW vii. 182, 177) . Without following the particulars of Arnold's argument here, one can simply note his claim that the 'eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness . . . is really a law of nature, collected from experience, just as much as the law of gravitation . . . it has its origin in experience, it appeals to experience, and by experience it is, as we believe, verified' (CPW vii. 191) .
Once again, my argument merely seeks to establish the causal link between the aim of Arnold's rhetorical strategy -conducting the world towards 'renouncement' -and his supposedly anti-theoretical rhetorical style: the deployment of religious and poetical exemplarity, the experiential touchstones that illustrate and embody the intuition, that sugar the pill of renunciation. Although T. S. Eliot claims that Arnold only 'wrote about poets when they provided a pretext for his sermon to the British public', Eliot was himself no stranger to homiletics. 40 He knew as well as Arnold that nothing breathes life into a sermon's abstract precepts like the warmblooded exempla that embody them, and he knew, as Arnold says, that 'There is nothing like positive instances to illustrate general propositions' (CPW x. 152). Rhetorical heft is often thus less a product of the logician's science than of the poet's art, and le mot juste -particularly le mot of a recognised authority -can still exude a charismatic charm for hearers. This affective peculiarity of rhetoric at least partly explains both the strong attraction and vehement repulsion that Arnold's touchstones have exerted in the development of academic English studies, a point that Eliot also notes when he says that 'to be able to quote as Arnold could is the best evidence of taste'. 41 Arnold's power of tasteful quotation is everywhere evident in his critical prose, and the deftness of his apposite illustrations lends his political and religious writings their memorable tone as well. 'Wragg is in custody' again springs immediately to mind, but equally notable are the Trafalgar Square truss manufactory of Culture and Anarchy, the Holy Trinity of Lord Shaftesbury in Literature and Dogma, and the dying prayer of Arminius in Friendship's Garland (1871): 'Say to Bottles from me . . . that I hope he will be comfortable with his dead wife's sister' (CPW v. 347) .
In every case, Arnold introduces the figures of his prosopopoeial rhetoric in order to influence his readers' conduct, to lead them towards 'renouncement' (the nec plus ultra of altruism), and this aim wholly conditions his rhetorical style. The goal of altering conduct can rarely if ever be attained merely by means of philosophical demonstrations, Arnold believes, because the majority of people are ill equipped for 'hard, abstruse reasoning' and but weakly moved by logical proofs in any case (CPW vi. 168) . No one ever became good by reading moral philosophya truism that Schopenhauer marks by noting that it would be 'just as foolish to expect that our moral systems and ethics would create virtuous, noble, and holy men, as that our aesthetics would produce poets, painters and musicians'. 42 Arnold the poet knows that stained glass and plainsong will sooner quicken hearts than scholastic disquisitions and cosmological proofs. Schopenhauer makes a similar point about the efficacy of examples in conveying the ascetic imperative of holiness, of quietening desire though self-renunciation:
As the knowledge from which results the denial of the will is intuitive and not abstract, it finds its complete expression not in abstract concepts, but only in the deed and in conduct. Therefore, in order to understand more fully what we express philosophically as denial of the will-to-live, we have to learn to know examples from experience and reality. 43 Only practical examples and concrete images -in other words, poetrycan sufficiently stir the imagination and light up the steep and narrow way to self-renunciation, a point that Arnold makes in his essay on Marcus Aurelius (1865) when he says that the 'mass of mankind can be carried along a course full of hardship for the natural man, can be borne over the thousand impediments of the narrow way, only by the tide of a joyful and bounding emotion' (CPW iii. 134). Unfortunately, much valuable ethical instruction intimidates us with its demands: 'It is impossible', Arnold says, 'to rise from reading Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius without a sense of constraint and melancholy, without feeling that the burden laid upon man is well-nigh greater than he can bear. Honour to the sages who have felt this, and yet have borne it!' For the rest of us, however, for the non-sages, a gentler disciplinary gradient is needed, because for the ordinary man, this sense of labour and sorrow constitutes an absolute disqualification; it paralyses him; under the weight of it he cannot make way toward the goal at all. The paramount virtue of religion is, that it has lighted up morality; that it has supplied the emotion and inspiration needful for carrying the sage along the 42 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, i. 217. 43 Ibid., p. 384.
century by American neo-humanists such as Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More -Eliot's role also deserves scrutiny -whose dour puritanism imposed a nearly permanent check on any adequate grasp of Arnoldian pessimism. Calculated both to edify and instruct the common reader, Arnold's rhetorical style easily obscures his own systematic effort to situate his argument in the interstitial gap between art, science, and religion, a position not unlike the unmoving center of the Platonic circle, where aesthetics reflects an inverted beauty in suffering, logic returns upon itself in paradox, and morality finds its practical end in an ethic of inaction.
